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Abstract
Universal social bene¯ts seem to contradict important notions in economics.
They are poorly targeted and must be paid for by what seem to be high taxes.
This paper describes the costs of universality and then proposes two competing
explanations for why an electorate might wish to pay these costs. It may be harder
to identify the poor through targeted social programs than to simply give everyone
social bene¯ts and withdraw part of these bene¯ts through the tax system. Or,
universality may be a form of political insurance that protects any one group of
voters from being exploited by others. Each conjectureleads to di®erent predictions
about the manner in which government bene¯ts will vary with the incomes of the
recipients. I use a model of tax and spending incidence for Canada in 1990 to see
which conjecture helps best to understand the data. I ¯nd mixed evidence in favor
of the notion that universality is a form of political insurance.
¤I thank John Matsusaka, Martin McGuire, Ja®er Qamar, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments
in the development of this paper. I also thank Isabella Horry for her able assistance in putting together
the datasets used here.
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Do improvements in social and economic objectives justify that governments now allo-
cate and redistribute between one third and two thirds of resources in the economy? Today,
many observers might answer this question in the negative.
Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995)
Introduction
Why do voters demand social programs with universal bene¯ts? This question is
vexing for political economists who believe that democracies do not destroy resources
needlessly. Universal social programs seem to be guilty of such destruction. They lead
to large amounts of ¯scal churning: citizens are taxed then returned the money in the
form of transfers. The result is a state in which there is much gross redistribution of
income and little net redistribution. The price for riding this ¯scal merry-go-round is the
deadweight loss of the taxes and subsidies that sit at the foundation of universality. The
goal of this paper is to understand why voters are willing to tolerate these deadweight
losses. Are voters su®ering from ¯scal illusion or do they have a calculated reason for
supporting what seems to be a wasteful means of redistributing income? In other words,
does universality represent needless waste or hidden e±ciency? The question is important
for the same reason that tests of stock market e±ciency are important: we want to know
if markets, political or economic, have cracks through which wealth escapes.
To test whether universality is a calculated choice by voters or represents a large and
constant popular miscalculation I look at the pattern of taxes and transfers across income
groups. There are two patterns to look for which might signify that voters' demands
for universality are well-reasoned: °at bene¯ts and rising taxes across income groups or
rising bene¯ts and rising taxes across income groups. Flat bene¯ts and rising taxes might
result if voters deem universal social bene¯ts in tandem with a progressive income tax
system to be the best mix of policy instruments for targeting the poor. The reasoning
behind this view is that a security blanket that covers all citizens puts modest demands
on government administrators to identify who is truly needy. The income tax system can
be used to claw back bene¯ts above what is deemed to be a critical income level.
A di®erent pattern of bene¯ts may tell a di®erent story. If bene¯ts rise across in-Palda 3
come groups, this may show that voters are demanding universality as insurance against
expropriation by other income or interest groups. Members of a group run this danger
because they cannot precisely measure government output. They face a signal extraction
problem that forces them to rely on an estimate of whether government is spending taxes
on public goods or on a sneaky redistribution of income. Universality reduces uncertainty
about who is getting what|it lessens the signal extraction problem. If voters demand
universality to protect themselves against sneaky expropriation, we should observe that
government bene¯ts rise with income, except at the very highest levels. This pattern
arises because most citizens can expect to experience rising incomes as they climb lad-
der of work experience. Universality will protect the gains of this progress from sneaky
expropriation by other citizens (who may be rich or poor, or average). The notion that
universality helps voters solve a signal extraction problem also has strong implications for
the pattern of sneaky transfers that voters receive. If universality is really there to clarify
who gets sneaky transfers, we should ¯nd that sneaky transfers are small for most voters.
How to estimate these sneaky transfers is an important part of this paper.
I ¯nd evidence that tends to support the idea that voters demand universality as a
form of political insurance. In this sense my results support the notion that universality
is an e±cient political strategy for redistribution, where e±ciency is taken in the narrow
technical sense that Becker (1983) and Wittman (1990) have framed it. In their view, a
policy is e±cient if it does not lead to systematic, easy to spot deadweight losses that do
no one any good given the political institutions in place. This does not mean that there
is no room to reform those institutions. Citizens might bene¯t from a political system
in which they did not have to "buy" costly insurance against net redistribution. In a
wider sense, such as that set out by Rowley and Vachris (1994), universality may be an
ine±cient by-product of democratic political systems.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 shows the degree of ¯scal churning
in Canada in 1990 and explains what costs this churning entails. These costs are of
two varieties. Universality ties a dollar of aid to the poor to a dollar of aid to higher
income groups. This tie limits government from ¯nding an e±cient spending mix among
all categories of public goods. Universality may also lead to a growth in government
and taxes. The extra taxes produce extra deadweight losses. Section 2 explains thatPalda 4
voters may be willing to tolerate churning and costs it imposes for two reasons. First,
universality may actually be low cost way of targeting the poor. Second, voters may
demanduniversality as insuranceagainst expropriationby other incomeor interestgroups.
Section 4 uses the data presented in Section 2 to distinguish which hypothesis is closer to
the truth. The section maps out the level of transfers by income decile and then suggests
how sneaky transfers might be measured.
1. Fiscal Churning
At ¯rst glance it seems strange that a government should take money out of someone's
pocket, ¯lter the money through a bureaucracy, and put the money back in that same
person's pocket. This churning of funds is the working principle of a universal system of
social bene¯ts. Table 1 measures churning in Canada in 1990 by all levels of government
(Table 2 gives demographic details on the sample used). Churning is the degree to which
governments could have reduced taxes and transfers without changing the bottom line of
any family's balance sheet. For example, a family receiving $1000 from the Canada Pen-
sion Plan and paying $5000 in taxes on other sources of revenue would have been equally
well o® without receiving any transfer and payingonly $4000 in taxes. Ifgovernments had
done away with all such "¯scal churning" from cash transfers spending could have been
$47.1 billion lower ( or 15.2% out of $309.5 billion spent by all governments in Canada in
1990).
Fiscal churning exists becausesome categoriesof governmenttransfer are opento every
citizen, without regard for his or her level of individual income or family income. This
means that taxpayers will be getting cash transfers. Fiscal churning looks more intense
if we broaden the categories of spending that government could have reduced in tandem
with taxes, without a®ecting any family's bottom line. If government spending on user
bene¯t goods such as hospitals, education, culture, and regional development are looked
on as perfect substitute for tax dollars, then columns three and four in Table 1 show the
degree to which Canadians governments could have reduced ¯scal churning.
Any measure of ¯scal churning is only as good as the incidence assumptions it uses
to calculate taxes and spending. Mueller (1989) warns Public Choice researchers aboutPalda 5
the lack of consensus on these assumptions in the public ¯nance literature. Noting this
warning, Ihave stuck closely toassumptions usedinprevious major studies (seeAppendix
for details) of incidence, and I have not tried to introduce any innovations into this
¯eld. Even though I stick to \mainstream" assumptions, I warn that my estimates tend
to favour the view that taxes are proportional to factor income. This means that I
may be underestimating the degree of churning. More taxes attributed to lower income
groups would lead to greater possible overall reductions in taxes and transfers in my
churning calculations. Even my, perhaps modest, estimates of churning though invite
speculation. What is prompting a society such as Canada with a free media, and an
educated population to tolerate this ride on the ¯scal merry-go-round?
With the exception of Mueller and Murrell (1985), and Tullock (1988) Public Choice
scholars devoted limited attention to this question. Most inquiries into the struggle for
public resources has looked at what determines the net level of transfers. Little attention
has been paid to what determines the gross level of transfers. It is this question to which
I now turn.
The Cost of Universality
Figuring out why citizens might demand universality, and the ¯scal churning that
comes with it, calls for a look at both sides of the social ledger. In this section I describe
the costs of universal government programs. In a following section I describe the bene¯ts.
The costs are easy to summarize. Universality imposes a restriction on government's
use of resources and may lead to excessive taxation. The following simple description of
government spending shows what sort of constraints are imposed (the description of costs
also sets the scene for a later description of the bene¯ts of universality): Consider a world
with two taxpayers an one poor individual who pays no taxes. Government spending is
divided between public works and alms for the poor:
G = W + Rpoor (1)
Where G is the dollar budget of government, W is spending on public works, and Rpoor
is spending on the deserving poor individual. Both taxpayers fund this system throughPalda 6
proportional taxation such that
T = t(Y1 + Y2) (2)
T = G (3)
Where T is the sum of taxes collected, and (Y1;Y2) are the incomes of each taxpayer, and
t is the uniform tax rate. Politicians win on a platform of maximizing voter wealth, which
includes cash income but also includes deadweight losses. Government's contribution to
wealth can be represented as







) s:t: W +Rpoor = t(Y1+ Y2) (4)
Here F is wealth created through providing public goods and publicly provided goods,
and F is distributed equally among citizens. For simplicity I assume that incomes are
equal and that wealth is evenly split between all citizens. If we ignore how we come to
a system of proportional taxation, a politician maximizes wealth by adjusting any two
of the three variables (W;Rpoor;t): The politician strives to maximize the wealth of the
median voter, which in this example we can take to be either voter 1 or voter 2. Voter
1's wealth is:




Where F¤ is the wealth government creates by manipulating taxes and spending.
Universality imposes a constraint on the maximization of F: Under universality every-
one gets the same transfer R: This imposes a new constraint on politicians:
Rpoor = R1 = R2 = R (6)
The government's budget constraint becomes
W +3R = t(Y1 +Y2) (7)




F¤¤ +R (8)Palda 7
Where F¤¤ is the wealth government creates by manipulating taxes and spending under
the new constraint of universality. Welfare is lower in this case than in the case of
unconstrained maximization. The extra tax dollars that need to be raised to pay for the
transfer to the rich dollars impose more of a cost on them than the bene¯ts of receiving a
dollar of transfers because taxes carry with them a deadweight loss. As Browning (1993)
has emphasized, when all citizens, rich and poor, receive a uniform transfer, the marginal
social cost of one dollar of net redistribution may be as high as three-and-a-half dollars.
The constraint of universality also means that for each dollar that goes to the poor,
three dollars have to be taken from public works. This gives rise to a universality "sub-
stitution e®ect" that warps spending away from the poor and more towards public works.
This lowers wealth beneath what if would be if the tradeo® between alms and works were
one to one as in the case of a world without universality. Reduced wealth due to this
distortion in the public goods input mix and due to deadweight losses imposed by the tax
system are the costs of universality.
2. The bene¯ts of universality
Why would voters accept universality if it lowers their wealth? Voters of course may be
su®ering from ¯scal illusion. These days though, due perhaps to the work of Oates (1988),
and Peltzman (1992), among others, the ¯scal illusionhypothesis is not in favor. Recently,
Hsieh (1995) has failed to ¯nd any evidence of long-term ¯scal illusion in Canada|the
country analysed in the present paper. Two explanations for universality that do not rely
on ¯scal illusion, are the following:
1. The ¯rst possibility is that universality is a low cost way of getting aid quickly to
the poor. The above model assumed that the poor can be immediately identi¯ed
and given government help. This is a naive assumption. There is usually a lag
between the onset of distress and government relief of that distress. If you have
fallen on hard times you must ¯nd your way to a government o±cial and convince
him or her that you qualify for help. Universality tries to minimize the o±cial's role
in getting you government help.1 If everyone automatically receives government
1Tullock (1988) takes a contrary view. He argues thatPalda 8
cheques for their children (so called baby bonuses), free health care, and education,
then government need not identify the poor. It can simply give everyone the same
bene¯ts and claw back these bene¯ts through the tax system. The clawback begins
at a level of income that the electorate deems to be above the level of basic need.
Such a view of e±ciency though may be extreme. As Sojo (1990) argues, it makes
sense for governments to supplement this basic safety net with more specialised
services that target the poor. These services might come on line once government
has had the time to identify the distressedindividual. If government mixes targeting
and universality for reasons of e±ciency in reaching the poor we should observe that
transfers are high and °at across the lower income deciles and lower but still °at
across the higher income deciles. The low °at level of these higher deciles represents
the universal system of bene¯ts that everyone enjoys, while the higher bene¯ts of
low income deciles represents targeted aid such as welfare or disability payments.
We should also ¯nd that taxes rise across income groups as the government claw
reaches back for transfers the state gives to those who are not in need.
2. The second possibility is that universality is a device that stops income groups from
secretly preying on each other. In the model developed earlier, without universality
voter 1may not know whether transfers are truly goingto the poor, or whether some
transfers are going to voter 2. Voter 1's ignorance may be due to random shocks in
the government's public goods production function. These shocks make it hard for
the voter to know precisely whether the government provided wealth F(W;Rpoor;t)
is due entirely to government spending or whether fortune has lent its hand to the
Universalization of programs often is urged on the grounds that income-tested programs
in fact do not reach all the poor...[this is] an extraordinarily expensive way of increasing
the number of poor people in the program. The poor people who do not participate in the
program do not presumably because partly they really don't like the program, partly they
have di±culty with the bureaucracy, and partly through mere ignorance. The ¯rst is not
a problem since people who voluntarily and with full knowledge choose not to enter the
program are presumably better o® outside it. The second would not in any way be a®ected
by universalizing the program since the red tape would probably be worse in a large program
than in a small program. The third calls for an advertising campaign...Palda 9
public enterprise. If voter 1 cannot judge the precise cost of public goods, then he
or she may be paying a price that is shaped by two forces:
P1 = true per capita cost+ (premium or discount) (9)
For example, suppose that government collects $50 in taxes from each of voters 1
and 2. Voter 1 gets a cash transfer R1= $20 and voter 2 gets R2 = $40. Neither
voter knows precisely the level of the other's cash (or "sneaky" transfer). Is voter
1 getting a good deal? This voter cannot know unless he or she knows the true per
capita cost government incurs in providing the public good. With two taxpayers,
the true cost per capita is 1
2(W + Rpoor) which in this case comes to $20. The net
taxes voter 1 pays are







where R1 are gross transfers to voter 1. This means that for voter 2, net taxes are







Without a direct knowledge of voter 2's transfers and a precise idea of the true cost
of the public good, voter 1 has trouble judging whether he is paying too much or too
little for the public good. Under universality with equal bene¯ts for all, no matter
what the size of transfers to voter 2, both voters would pay the true price of the
public good. There would be no sneaky net transfers. There would only be ¯scal
churning to the extent that the transfers of each individual not classi¯ed as poor
could be reduced to zero and the taxes of this individual could be reduced by the
amount of the transfer. Universality establishes clearly who gets what. It is di±cult
for governments to get around this commitment because universal programs push
government's claim on the private economy to its limits. Sneaky transfers outside
the framework of universality impose heavy deadweight costs because universality
raises the marginal cost of public funds. In a similar vein, Alesina (1990) has argued
that present generations can constrain the spending patterns (and presumably the
pattern of transfers) of future generations by passing on a large public debt.Palda 10
In the above example, incomes are the same. When incomes di®er, each voter might
accept to pay a price for the public good which is proportional to his or her income.
This conjecture is in line with evidence from developed economies and is consistent
with recent theoretical e®orts going back to Hochman and Rodgers (1969), in which
altruistic citizens will not object to discriminatory tax pricing of public goods. Such
a discriminatory, or "fair" price can be denoted as Si(W + Rpoor) where Si is the
indexed voter's share of total income produced by taxpayers. Suppose that the
income of voter 1 is $120, that of voter 2 is $80, the tax rate is 50%. Government
collects $100 and spends half on legitimate public goods (W + Rpoor) and half on
sneaky transfers (R1;R2): Since voter 1 has three ¯fth of all income earned, his fair
tax price should be $30 and that of voter 2 should be $20. If voter 1 gets $20 in
sneaky transfers then his or her net tax price is







This means that voter 2 is getting $30 in sneaky transfers and that his or her net
tax price is







Under a system of universality where bene¯ts are proportional to the income shares
S; no matter what the size of the cash transfer, all voters would pay the fair price.
As in the simpler previous example where everyone's income was the same, uni-
versality solves the voter's "signal extraction problem". A similar signal extraction
problem is at the heart of a macroeconomic model of aggregate supply formalized
by Lucas (1973). In Lucas' model producers must judge whether the change in price
they observe represents a rise in relative price or a rise in the overall price level.
In the present model, the voter must judge whether the tax price imposed upon
him or her represents the fair price (a component of which is included in everyone's
tax price) or whether that price also includes a discount or premium particular to
the voter. If we now assume that there are N voter-taxpayers whose tax bills in-
clude a component re°ecting the true price of the public good and a componentPalda 11
representing a discount or markup particular to the voter, then voter i must try to
disentangle these components by considering the following equation (to ease nota-
tion all variables are assumed to represent current period ¿ values unless otherwise
indicated):






where – is the voter's discount (either positive or negative) and Si = Yi=
PN
i=1Yi
(the share of voter i's income in national income). Voter i can consider both terms
to be random variables. They are random in the sense that this voter only knows
that his –i is drawn from a distribution of possible values across the population of
citizens. The discount has zero mean (because over the population net transfers
must be zero) and variance of ￿2
–: The fair cost of public goods can be expressed as
Si(W + Rpoor) = E[Si(W + Rpoor)j-¿¡1] + " (15)
where -¿¡1 is the voter's information set in the previous period and " is a ran-
dom shock that is uncorrelated with the voter's forecast. Thinking of legitimate
government spending in this fashion means that we can express i0s net tax price as
Pi = Si(W +Rpoor) +E[Si(W + Rpoor)j-¿¡1] +" + –i (16)
Using Bayes' theorem, and linear least-squares prediction based on some knowledge
of the ¯rst and second moments of " and –i as well as their cross moments, the savvy
voter can use the observed value of Pi to invert the logic of the above equation and
get an updated estimate of legitimate government spending on his behalf Si(W +
Rpoor): It can be shown (see Sargent 1979) that this updated estimate is:






" which is the fraction in conditional variation in observed price Pi
due to sneaky transfers –i: If most of the variation in own price comes about due to
variation in sneaky transfers, then the voter will give low weight to his own price in
updating his estimate of legitimate government spending. With his estimate of thisPalda 12
legitimate spending he can get some idea of what his markup or discount is. All he
has to do is subtract his observed price from his estimate of legitimate government
spending:
Pi ¡ E [Si(W +Rpoor)j-¿¡1;Pi] = ￿ (Pi ¡ E[Si(W + Rpoor)j-¿¡1]) (18)
= " + –i (19)
The point that emerges is that the quality (in a mean-squared error sense) of the
least-squares forecast of legitimate spending (and hence of sneaky spending) will
depend on the variances of the estimates of the standard errors of legitimate gov-
ernment spending and ofsneaky transfers. The varianceof theestimates will depend
positively on the true standard error of sneaky transfers and legitimate spending,
and negatively upon the number of observations on which voters can draw. The
problem of estimation gets worse the higher one climbs in the income scale because
the standard error of Si(W + Rpoor) rises in direct proportion to Si: This is not
surprising.2 A low income voter will attribute most changes in his net tax price to
changes in his discount because his low income share leaves the fair price component
of his net tax price little room in which to change.
Who will want universality in such a political environment? In the present model
highincomegroups are athighrisk ofpaying apremium for their public goods. They
have a hard time judging whether they are paying a fair price because the variance
of their estimates is high. These groups are in no position to punish politicians who
charge them a high premium and redistribute the money to lower income groups. In
contrast, lower income groups are in a position to reward politicians for discounts
in their price of public goods because these groups can make better estimates of
their fair public good price. At ¯rst glance, this pattern of political risk suggests
2The variance of voter i0s fair price of legitimate government spending rises not only with the variance
of legitimate government spending but also with the square of the individual's income share:
￿
2









that there would be little consensus among voters about universality. The desire
for universality would be small among those at the lower end of the income scale.
At second glance one must note that most voters experience gains in their income
over their lives, as their work experience accumulates. This expectation of rising
through the income scale might encourage voters to demand a system of taxes and
redistribution in which they are protected from the risk of sneaky expropriation as
their means improve. This could lead to a system of universality in which bene¯ts
are geared to the incomes of all except perhaps the richest of citizens.3
If this reasoning is correct then we should observe that the discounts or premiums –i
should be close to zero for all but the richest income groups. This would show that
universality is doing its job of keeping hidden discounts low for most voters. The
problem with this conjecture is that it is di±cult to test directly. An indirect test is
to simply look at the pattern of transfers. These should rise with income. The more
direct test is to regress the price each voter pays for his or her government services
on his or her share of national income. In other words, estimate the equation
Pi = taxes-transfers = a0 + a1Si + –i (22)
The estimated coe±cient along with information on each voter's income share can
then be used to estimate the discounts or premium (–i) each pays. Estimating
this discount is the most speculative part of this paper and will come last. What
follows now is an attempt to measure the transfers di®erent income groups get from
government.
3Voters who take an inter-temporal view of redistribution and consider where they are likely to end
up in the income scale, may explain the problematic observations raised by Saint-Paul (1996), who has
found that changing income inequality does not lead to changing demands for income redistribution.Palda 14
3. The Pattern of Bene¯ts
Background
Tracing the pattern of transfers is not a simple matter of pulling down a statistical
series on government cash transfers by income group from an o±cial database. This is
certainly part of the exercise, but another part of the exercise is to nuance what transfers
are. As suggested earlier, some transfers masquerade as government spending on public
goods. Any claim as to what quali¯es as these sneaky transfers is open to debate. Is
health care a straight transfer? What about education? Spending on these services might
be considered a straight transfer if, given the cash, the household would have spent it as
government spent it. I do not try to enter this debate on what a transfer is. Rather, my
goal is to ¯nd the pattern of di®erent categories of government expenditure by income
group andto give the reader a choice of results to choose from. First I mapout direct cash
transfers such as the Canada Pension Plan, unemployment insurance, family allowance
payments, and old age security. Ithen examine this patternto see whether it is consistent
withthe e±ciency view of universality or withthe insurance view. I repeat the exercise by
including government spending on health, education, and other categories of government
spending that bene¯t one individual to the exclusion of others. I call the sum of cash
transfers and exclusive spending on individuals "bene¯t goods." Finally I allocate all
government spending excluding debt repayment to families and test my two competing
views of universality against these broad ¯gures. I leave the reader to choose which
category of government spending is most relevant to the hypotheses being tested here.
The case I study is spending by all levels of government in Canada in the year 1990.
The data come in part from government budgets and in part from surveys of household
income and spending. My goal has been to allocate government spending to households.
Households can provide part ofthis information directly by stating the cash transfers they
received from government. What they cannot tell you is exactly how much government
spent on their behalf for health, education, roads, culture, and other items. The model I
use to allocate these categories of government spending is a simple variant of that used
by Gillespie (1980) and more recently by Payette and Vaillancourt (1986) who reason asPalda 15
follows: If we ¯nd that a household sends twice as many of its children to university as its
neighborthenwe "allocate"twice as muchgovernmentspendingonuniversity educationto
that household. To get the ¯nal allocation we have to go through two steps. First ¯nd out
how much each family consumes of the government service relative to other households.
In other words ¯nd out the shares of each household's consumption (most of this data
comes from surveys). Next, multiply each household's share by the total amount spent by
all levels of government (most of this data comes from government budgetary estimates).
The exercise is not to calculate the bene¯t a household receives from government but to
trace how much money government spent on behalf of the household. The reason I do not
attempt to calculate bene¯ts|as Aron and McGuire (1970), Piggott and Whalley (1987)
and several others have attempted|is that I am interested purely in the price citizens of
di®erent income levels pay for their government services. Information on this price rests
in the amount of cash government gives to a householdand possibly ongoods and services
government buys on that household's behalf.
Results
Table 3gives estimates of transfers andtaxes per economic family in eachof tenincome
deciles. I de¯ne income as the pre-tax-and-transfer cash in°ows a family gets from its
labour, its holdings of capital.4 The income of the median voter is found in the 6th income
decile. Median income is not in the ¯fth decile because di®erent families have di®erent
numbers of eligible voters. It appears that there are relatively more eligible voters in high
income families than in low income families.
Figures 1 charts three highlighted rows from Table 3. One set of bars in Figure shows
cash transfers per family across deciles. The pattern in this ¯gure supports the e±ciency
view of universality more closely than it supports the insurance view. The e±ciency
4I chose pre-transfer income to de¯ne deciles with the following example in mind. A poor family
su®ering from extreme physical disabilities may receive transfer payments which make that family appear
to be middle or even upper-income. If there were many such families in the sample and I used post-transfer
income to de¯ne deciles I might deduce from looking at the data that high income families also receive
generous transfers. This would be a questionable deduction because for some families the causality runs
in the opposing direction; they are high income because they receive large transfers.Palda 16
view holds that transfers should be °at and high across low income groups and °at and
low across high income groups. All deciles share a common base of cash transfer base
in the region of $6000. The ¯rst three deciles get uniformly more transfers than higher
deciles. This re°ects the fact that these groups are the main object of targeted aid that
comes on top of their universal bene¯ts. This would tend to support the e±ciency view
of universality.
The remaining two sets of bars tell a story more in line with the political insurance
view of universality. Consider the bars showing the amount government spends on user
bene¯t goods for households of di®erent income deciles. User bene¯t goods include cash
transfers but also include government spending on health, education, regional, industrial,
and agricultural development, culture and recreation, transportation and communication,
and labour retraining and matching. These expenditures show less of a tendency to fall
with income and even begin to rise past the 4th income decile. The same tendency is even
more pronounced in the bars that represent total government spending on a family.
These rising pattern of bene¯ts ¯gures may support the view that universal bene¯ts
are a form of political insurance. Stronger support for this view would come from asking
whether the discounts or premiums most voters pay are close to zero. To this end I have
run regressions of the equation (see Table 5 for a discussion of the econometric challenges
posed by this estimation):
Pi = a0 +a1Si +–i
Recall that Pi = taxes-transfers; of family I and Si is family i0s share of national income.
The residuals in this regression can be interpreted as the discounts or premiums that
come about through sneaky transfers, while the coe±cient (a1) to be estimated can be
interpreted as what voters believe to be government spending on public works and on
needy lower income families (W +Rpoor):
I have used three di®erent measures of the net price of publicly provided goods and
services Pi: The ¯rst measure is the tax each household pays less its cash transfers. Figure
2(the exactnumbers appear inTable 4) mapsthe premiums anddiscounts estimatedusing
this measure of Pi: Figure 2 also maps the discounts when taxes less the amount spent
on user bene¯t goods are taken as the net price of publicly provided goods and services,Palda 17
and the discounts or premiums using the household's taxes less all the money government
spends on its behalf as the price of publicly provided goods and services.
Two patterns stand out from Figure 2. The ¯rst is that discounts seem "°at" across
income groups when compared to the variation in transfers evident in Figure 1. Only
at extremes of the income scale is – extreme. The richest are paying a premium beyond
their \fair" net tax price and the poor are receiving a signi¯cant discount. If we look at
all but the bottom and top deciles, it appears that some force is at work to limit hidden
gifts government can make. Universality may be the force in question.
The second thing that stands out of Figure 2 is that, as one moves to more general
measures of the price of publicly provided goods and services, the pro¯le of discounts
becomes °atter. Cash transfers may underestimate the degree of universality built into
government expenditures. This is why the pro¯le of discounts when net tax price is mea-
sured as taxes less cash transfers is steeper. Health care and education may have a strong
redistributive component that progresses with income. This redistributive component will
tend to °atten the discounts di®erent income groups get. This is why we observe a °atter
pro¯le of discounts in the remaining two sets of bars in Figure 2.
It is important to note here that the discounts and premiums are not themselves
sneaky transfers. They are the premiums above or below the fair tax price that di®erent
income groups pay. A discount does not mean that a group is getting more in transfers
than it pays in taxes. It means that the group is paying less than its fair share. Similarly
a premium does not mean a group is paying more than it gets in transfers. It could
mean that the group is getting less than its fair share of transfers relative to the taxes it
pays. This may explain the strong positive premium for the lowest income group. This
distinction between transfers and discounts or premiums is a crucial for those interested
in the question of which income groups pro¯t at the expense of others. The line in Table
3 entitled \net bene¯ts" shows the dollar amount governments spent on the average
household in a decile less that household's taxes. These net bene¯ts are highest for the
lowest income groups andfall steadily, until they turn negative at the 8th income decile. It
would seem that the lower seven deciles are extorting money from the upper three deciles.
This is a super¯cial analysis though, which ignores the degree to which all citizens agree
that taxes should rise with income. Once we factor in this possibility, we can get to aPalda 18
truer measure of redistribution beyond what is considered \fair."
Table 5 shows the regression results for the three measure of Pi: The regression co-
e±cient attached to income share is worth noting. In theory this coe±cient represents
the true government price of spending on infrastructures and alms for the needy. This
coe±cient comes to about 80% of total government program spending in Canada in 1990.
While infrastructure and the poor are vague terms, one could make an informal case that
the estimated coe±cient is not too far o® from what is believed to be the hard core of
productive government spending.
Problems with the Analysis
One should look on this coe±cient and the accompanying discounts and premiums
with caution. There may be omitted variables in my regressions which could bias my
estimates. The degree of bias would depend on how closely these variable are correlated
with the income share variable. Another way of stating this is that I am estimating the
discounts and premiums based on my public information set|taken from surveys and
government budgetary estimates. What really matters though is what taxpayers perceive
these residuals to be. Taxpayers will estimate the residuals usingtheir private information
sets. I am inferring that they see what I see: that the results of universality are to °atten
these residuals, and thus to act as a form of political insurance against sneaky transfers.
A larger problem is that my results depend on my assumptions about the incidence
of taxes and government spending. I have followed Browning (1978) in assuming that
consumptiontaxes areproportional tofactor incomes. It is arguablethat iftheassumption
is wrong my results will tend to show that the rich pay more taxes than they pay in fact.
This would make my calculated discount pro¯le look steeper than it should be. So in
fact this assumption I have made about consumption taxes works against my conjecture
that universality is a form of social insurance. Estimating the distributional impact of
government spending is an even more speculative venture. Le Grand (1985) has nicely
summarized the problems that plague this ¯eld. My answer to these potential critique is
that the goal of this paper has not been towards improving incidence models, but rather
to take some widely used models and show how they can be applied to understand aPalda 19
critical question in Public Choice.
Conclusion
Data on government transfers to Canadian households in the year 1990 may suggest
that transfers serve as political insurance in that country. If true, the result is interesting
because it says something about political e±ciency. When voters began to demand more
publicly provided goods from government several decades ago, they may have realized
that sneaky redistribution of resources was a risk that came with a growing government.
The risk lies in that voters have trouble judging the value of government output. This
gives politicians slack to start projects in the public interest that secretly serve private
interests. Universal social programs eliminate this uncertainty by reducing government's
discretion about who gets special favours. Universality could be politically e±cient in the
sense that it limits rent-seeking.
The political e±ciency of universality does not mean that we are living in the best of
all possible worlds. Running to the bomb shelter without losing your breath may show
that you can evade bombs e±ciently. It would be nicer though to live in a world without
bombs. The larger question remains of why existing political institutions expose voters
to the risk of sneaky transfers. The cost of insuring against this risk through a universal
social system may be steep, as my ¯nding that 15.2% of government spending may be
churned suggests. Transfers for all lead to high taxes, and set most citizens on a ¯scal
merry-go-round of receiving transfers and having them taxed away. Political e±ciency
in the narrow sense I have explored it here may be a reaction to political ine±ciency
on a larger scale. Future researchers may wish to measure the level of ¯scal churning in
di®erent political systems to see what features of those system keep levels of churning
low.Palda 20
APPENDIX
Distribution of Government Spending and Taxes by Income groups
The method used in the present paper for distributing the tax burden can be found in the work of
Browning (1978). The method for distributing the incidence of government spending follows Payette and
Vaillancourt (1986), with some exceptions listed below. The trick in ¯guring out who bene¯ted from
government spending is to see who is consuming services and goods that are either provided directly by
government or subsidized by government. If we ¯nd that a family sends twice as many of its children to
university as its neighbor then we "allocate" twice as much government spending on university education
to that family. To get the ¯nal allocation we have to go through two steps. First ¯nd out how much
each family consumes of the government service relative to other families. In other words ¯nd out the
shares of each family's consumption (most of this data comes from surveys). Next, multiply each family's
share by the total amount spent by all levels of government (most of this data comes from government
budgetary estimates).
Government spending shares are allocated across families by using two Statistics Canada surveys,
the Survey of Consumer Finance and the Family Expenditure Survey. The Survey of Consumer Finances
covers 45,580 individual families (each is weighted so as to obtain the total number of families in the ten
provinces), and details socio- economic family characteristics. The Family Expenditure Survey gives in-
formation on family expenditure for 4,856 families, including spending on automotive fuel, recreation, and
medicines among others. The series are merged using a technique developed by Payette and Vaillancourt.
Here is how these series are used to allocate government spending:
Cash Transfers These include Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan payments, unemployment
insurance payments, family allowance payments, old age security payments and other transfers.
The incidence assumption with these transfers is that they should be completely allocated to
the direct recipients. This is implicitly assuming that supply of the goods that recipients buy is
perfectly elastic, so that none of the transfer is passed on to producers in form of higher prices.
Health The assumption here is that expenditures on health are made on behalf of those who consume
health services (this of course neglects the possibility that health has public goods features which
also bene¯t those who do not directly consumer health services). Who consumes these services is
catalogued in part by a Statistics Canada study of hospital expenditure by age group (StatisticsPalda 21
Canada, catalogue 83-522E "An Analysis of Hospital expenditures in Canada") which is then
merged with the population data from the survey of consumer ¯nances.
Education It is assumed that education expenses are proportional to the number of people in the family
who are attending school. The surveys used show the number of students attending a elementary,
secondary, and post-secondary school and these data are used toallocate total government spending
on schooling. This of course neglects the possibility that schooling has public goods features which
also bene¯t those who do not have children attending school.
Regional Planning and Development and Resource Conservation and Industrial Development (specif-
ically Agriculture, Tourism, and Trade and Industry) Expenditures on agriculture are assumed
to be made on behalf of farmers and are allocated equally to all families reporting net farm self-
employed income in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Regional planning and development chie°y
covers municipal public works and could be distributed on a per household basis. Trade and in-
dustry is a more direct help to business and could thus be distributed by a series on dividends.
Fifty percent of the sum of regional planning and development and trade and industry (including
tourism) is allocated by capital income and the remaining ¯fty percent is allocated across families
by the series on total consumption. The ¯rst series come from the Survey of Consumer Finances
and the second is derived from the Family Expenditure Survey.
Labour The assumption is that expenditures in this category are made on behalf of labour and thus
are allocated directly to labour using a series on wages and salaries from the Survey of Consumer
Finances. To the extent that these expenditures are made to trainees and the unemployed, this
series will understate expenditures made on behalf of the lower income groups.
Housing Government housing expenditures are distributed by the series "Other Government Transfer
Payments" from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Culture and Recreation The assumption is that culture and recreation expenditures are made on behalf
of those people who consume culture and recreation services. Thus, these expenditures should be
allocated directly to them. Expenditures are distributed across families by the series, "Consump-
tion of Recreation," derived from the Family Expenditure Survey, which covers everything from
movies and ballets to camping equipment and stereos.Palda 22
Transportation and Communications Expenditures under transportation and communications are bro-
ken down into two categories: highway and other. Highway expenditures are on highways, roads,
and road maintenance. Other expenditures are on air, rail, and water. Who bene¯ts from these
expenditures? Four groups are identi¯ed under the sub-function highway. Two per cent of highway
expenditures are allocated to national defense as that is approximately the expenditure on defense
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. National defense is distributed proportionately across
individuals. Following Gillespie (1980) two other groups are non-users and road-users. He allocates
one third of government expenditures to non-users and two thirds to road-users. The logic is that
the non-user group that bene¯ts are property owners, that is their property values are enhanced
by access to roadways. These non-user bene¯ciaries can be identi¯ed by their capital income as
listed in the Survey of Consumer Finances. The other group road-users can be further sub-divided
into two groups: those who bene¯t from the lower prices of goods transported via roads and those
who consume road services to travel, to go to work. One third of the two thirds set aside for road-
users is allocated to those bene¯ting from the lower price of transported goods by a series on total
consumption from the Family Expenditure Survey. The remainder is allocated to consumption of
road services, which is proxied by the consumption of automotive fuel. This series is derived from
the Family Expenditure Survey. Other transportation is distributed equally across individuals.
Environment, Foreign A®airs and International Assistance, General Services, Other, Protection of
Persons and Property, Research Establishments, Resource Conservation and Industrial Develop-
ment net of Agriculture, Tourism, and Trade and Industry These categories of expenditure about
as close as one can get to pure public good spending. So the approach here has been to allocate
spending on these categories proportionally across families.
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WHAT CANADIAN HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT INCOME DECILES ON AVERAGE
GOT OUT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 1990 (DOLLARS)
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
User Bene¯t Goods 21,535 20,076 18,547 17,168 17,474 17,652 19,028 19,938 20,518 24,190
Of which: Cash Transfers 13,123 11,360 9,613 7,370 6,772 5,786 5,776 5,599 5,248 6,078
Public Goods: 3,751 3,972 4,355 4,913 5,356 5,927 6,534 6,879 7,094 7,414
Total Bene¯ts 25,311 24,047 22,903 22,080 22,830 23,578 25,562 26,817 27,612 31,604
Tax 343 2,476 6,786 10,900 15,378 20,130 25,493 31,725 41,385 74,061
Net Bene¯ts 24,957 21,572 16,117 11,180 7,452 3,448 69 -4,908 -13,772 -42,457
Note: There are a total of 45,580 families in the sample. Statistics Canada has assigned a weight to each to make the sample representativ
of the total population. Cash Transfers are a subset of all bene¯t goods and include cash received from unemployment insurance, Canad
and Quebec pension plans, family allowances, old age security, and "other transfers". The remaining components of bene¯ts goods are th
amounts government spent on health, education, resource conservation, industrial development, labor, housing, culture and recreation
transportation and communication. Public goods include spending by all levels of government on the environment, general service
protection of persons and property, research establishments, foreign a®airs and international assistance. The category "Total Bene¯ts"
the sum of government spending on public goods, cash transfers and bene¯t goods. The values are dollar value averages for households i
each decile.TABLE 2
DECILE AVERAGE OF HOUSEHOLD PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS (DOLLARS)
ESTIMATED
BY OLS AND WLS FROM THE SNEAKY TRANSFER EQUATION (CANADA 1990)
Pi = a0 +a1Si+ a2PROV INCE +–i
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1990 $ Discount or Premium estimated under OLS when
Net Tax=Taxes minus -2,440 -2,523 -1,370 5 385 1,226 1,295 1,105 1,444 59
Cash Transfers ( 7,838) ( 9,886) ( 9,440) ( 9,506) ( 9,102) ( 8,051) ( 8,902) (8,327) (9,690) (16,241
Net Tax=Taxes minus -1,859 -1,343 115 1,104 1,011 1,148 313 -334 -78 -46
Value of Bene¯t Goods (9,024) (12,329) (13,233) (13,487) (13,826) (11,786) (12,965) (11,283) (13,024) (17,942
Net Taxes=Taxes Minus -1,026 -588 735 1,344 1,012 729 - 456 -1,177 -819 -10
Value of Government Spending (9,898) (13,860) (15,320) (15,654) (16,198) (13,867) (15,276) (13,015) (15,028) (19,229
1990 $ Discount or Premium estimated under WLS when
Net Tax=Taxes minus -4,257 -3,259 -2,109 -720 -300 562 665 481 869 18
Cash Transfers (7,838) (9,886) (9,440) (9,506) (9,102) (8,051) (8,902) (8,327) (9,690) (16,241
Net Tax=Taxes minus -3,113 -1,858 -354 681 635 824 39 - 567 -225 -24
Value of Bene¯t Goods (9,024) (12,329) (13,233) (13,487) (13,826) (11,786) (12,965) (11,283) (13,024) (17,942
Net Tax=Taxes minus -1,601 -295 982 1,540 1,155 820 -419 - 1,223 -954 -49
Value of Government Spending (9,898) (13,860) (15,320) (15,654) (16,198) (13,867) (15,276) (13,015) (15,028) (19,229
Note: The above values are the estimated residuals –; drawn from the regression equation Pi = a0 +a1Si + a2PROV INCE +–i: Values
in brackets as standard deviations from the mean. Please see Table 3 for estimates of the OLS and WLS regressions from which these
residuals have been drawn. The numbers drawn from the OLS estimation are represented in Figures 2a and 2b.TABLE 3
ORDINARY AND WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE SNEAKY
TRANSFER EQUATION FOR CANADA IN 1990 (USING THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS
OF NET TAX PRICE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES):
Pi = a0 +a1Si +a2PROVINCE+ –i
Net Tax Price Concept
Taxes less Cash Taxes less Amount Spent Taxes less All Government
Transfers on Bene¯t Goods Spending on the Household
Ordinary Least Squares
Independent Variable
Share of Household's Income 254,502,702,254 220,667,126,417 204,753,043,051
in National Income (Si) (38,057,300) (49,883,165) (58,215,715)
British Columbia Dummy -9,813 -17,805 -20,843
(11) (14) (16)
Alberta Dummy -7,848 -19,719 -23,442
(12) (16) (18)
Saskatchewan Dummy -8,712 -21,793 -25,241
(19) (25) (29)
Manitoba Dummy -10,701 -20,942 -25,119
(18) (24) (27)
Ontario Dummy -9,165 -17,034 -21,101
(7) (10) (11)
Quebec Dummy -8,341 -16,136 -20,281
(8) (10) (11)




Signi¯cance of F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weighted Least Squares
Share of Household's Income 254,748,286,987 220,215,051,671 209,769,152,277
in National Income (Si) (32,870,143) (43,304,483) (50,175,107)
British Columbia Dummy -10,058 -17,811 -21,449
(12) (16) (18)
Alberta Dummy -6,502 -18,612 -22,969
(13) (18) (20)
Saskatchewan Dummy -8,550 -22,143 -26,064
(22) (29) (33)
Manitoba Dummy -10,449 -20,951 -25,799
(20) (27) (31)
Ontario Dummy -8,135 -15,706 -20,554
(8) (11) (12)
Quebec Dummy -7,038 -15,018 -19,857
(9) (12) (13)




Signi¯cance of F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Variables in brackets are standard errors of the coe±cient estimates. There are a total of 45,580 families
in the sample. Statistics Canada has assigned a weight to each to make the sample representative of the total
population. Three di®erent net tax price concepts were used (see text for details). The weighted least squares
regression was estimated to accountforthe possibility of heteroskedasticity. The weightused was the inverse ofthe
square root of the households share of income in national income.TABLE 4
DECILE AVERAGE OF HOUSEHOLD PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS ESTIMATED BY
OLS AND WLS FOR (CANADA 1990) FROM THE SNEAKY TRANSFER EQUATION
Pi = a0 +a1Si + a2PROV INCE–i
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1990 $ Discount or Premium estimated under OLS when
Net Tax=Taxes minus -6,211 -4,767 -3,784 -2,062 -1,612 -491 -300 -166 609 550
Cash Transfers
Net Tax=Taxes minus -6,897 -5,300 -3,933 -2,316 -2,135 -1,406 -1,992 -1,967 -791 683
Value of Bene¯t Goods
Net Taxes=Taxes Minus -6,532 -5,051 -3,905 -2,539 -2,608 -2,167 -3,149 -3,139 -1,722 790
Value of Government Spending
1990 $ Discount or Premium estimated under WLS when
Net Tax=Taxes minus -6,211 -4,767 -3,784 -2,062 -1,612 -491 -300 -166 609 550
Cash Transfers
Net Tax=Taxes minus -6,897 -5,300 -3,933 -2,316 -2,135 -1,406 -1,992 -1,967 -791 683
Value of Bene¯t Goods
Net Tax=Taxes minus -6,532 -5,051 -3,905 -2,539 -2,608 -2,167 -3,149 -3,139 -1,722 790
Value of Government Spending
Note: The above values are the estimated residuals –; drawn from the regression equation Pi = ﬁSi + –i: Please see
Table 5 for estimates of the OLS and WLS regressions from which these residuals have been drawn. The numbers drawn
from the OLS estimation are represented in Figure 2.TABLE 5
ORDINARY AND WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE SNEAKY
TRANSFER EQUATION FOR CANADA IN 1990 (USING THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS
OF NET TAX PRICE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES):
Pi = a0 +a1Si +a2PROVINCE+ –i
Net Tax Price Concept
Taxes less Cash Taxes less Amount Spent Taxes less All Government
Transfers on Bene¯t Goods Spending on the Household
Ordinary Least Squares
Independent Variable
Share of Household's Income 254,502,702,254 220,667,126,417 204,753,043,051
in National Income (Si) (38,057,300) (49,883,165) (58,215,715)
British Columbia Dummy -9,813 -17,805 -20,843
(11) (14) (16)
Alberta Dummy -7,848 -19,719 -23,442
(12) (16) (18)
Saskatchewan Dummy -8,712 -21,793 -25,241
(19) (25) (29)
Manitoba Dummy -10,701 -20,942 -25,119
(18) (24) (27)
Ontario Dummy -9,165 -17,034 -21,101
(7) (10) (11)
Quebec Dummy -8,341 -16,136 -20,281
(8) (10) (11)




Signi¯cance of F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weighted Least Squares
Share of Household's Income 254,748,286,987 220,215,051,671 209,769,152,277
in National Income (Si) (32,870,143) (43,304,483) (50,175,107)
British Columbia Dummy -10,058 -17,811 -21,449
(12) (16) (18)
Alberta Dummy -6,502 -18,612 -22,969
(13) (18) (20)
Saskatchewan Dummy -8,550 -22,143 -26,064
(22) (29) (33)
Manitoba Dummy -10,449 -20,951 -25,799
(20) (27) (31)
Ontario Dummy -8,135 -15,706 -20,554
(8) (11) (12)
Quebec Dummy -7,038 -15,018 -19,857
(9) (12) (13)




Signi¯cance of F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Variables in brackets are standard errors of the coe±cient estimates. There are a total of 45,580 families
in the sample. Statistics Canada has assigned a weight to each to make the sample representative of the total
population. Three di®erent net tax price concepts were used (see text for details). The weighted least squares
regression was estimated to accountforthe possibility of heteroskedasticity. The weightused was the inverse ofthe
square root of the households share of income in national income.